Prevenire le frodi attraverso il modello organizzativo 231. Utopia?

Le cronache continuano ad evidenziare un incremento considerevole dei casi di frode aziendale, in tutti i contesti merceologici con il coinvolgimento anche di realtà molto grandi e strutturate, nonostante la "231" e il suo continuo arricchimento con nuovi reati presupposto.

Questo porterebbe a confermare ciò che ormai da alcuni anni si sente sussurrare ai convegni sui modelli organizzativi ex dlgs 231. Considerazioni esplicitate più o meno timidamente anche da navigati internal auditor, autorevoli magistrati ed esponenti delle forze di polizia economico-finanziaria o da illustri accademici. Prese d'atto di un sistema che non sembra funzionare affatto per come è stato progettato.
E che probabilmente non ha mai funzionato.

E' doveroso dopo più di un decennio, con assoluta onestà, fare il punto sull'utilità attuale dei modelli organizzativi 231. Sulla loro capacità di prevenire i comportamenti illeciti, sulla loro validità a mitigare le vulnerabilità e le debolezze di una governace piena di conflitti d'interesse. Di una governance che troppe volte ha visto i modelli di prevenzione del rischio di frode, tra i quali vanno assolutamente compresi i modelli organizzativi 231, come un vero e proprio intralcio alla competitività.

Nel 2001 si sperava che responsabilizzando le aziende sull'enorme problematica della criminalità economico-finanziaria, sul suo dilagare anche nei contesti tradizionalmente più immuni, nel tempo si sarebbero ridotti i fenomeni fraudolenti riportando la patologia a livelli tollerabili.
E' successo esattamente il contrario.

In generale la 231 è rimasta una semplice procedura scritta sulla carta e archiviata su di uno scaffale, come tante altre. In bella mostra e da esibire al magistrato di turno.
Una sorta di polizza assicurativa a tutela degli "imprevisti" di percorso, sempre possibili nella vita aziendale.
Un modello a volte banale, il cui merito più probabile è stato quello di aver dato lavoro a parecchie schiere di professionisti.

Col senno di poi, la strategia migliore sarebbe stata innanzitutto quella di favorire o promuovere una robusta formazione di bravi fraud auditor, esperti di prevenzione delle frodi aziendali (fraud risk management) e di mappatura dei rischi collegati (fraud risk assessment). Introducendo corsi specialistici negli indirizzi universitari economico-giuridici e nei corsi post-laurea.
E successivamente, una volta formati i professionisti, introdurre i modelli organizzativi da sviluppare e gestire con un approccio del tutto diverso da quello tipico dell'internal auditing.
Il modello 231 in questo caso sarebbe stato uno strumento formidabile nella mani di fraud auditor esperti e non un'occasione mancata.

Ma le cose, rispetto alle aspettative originarie, con tutta evidenza, sono andate diversamente.

Royalty audit: la tutela della proprietà intellettuale

Le più moderne strategie di sviluppo legate alla proprietà industriale si basano sul concetto di licensing, formula contrattuale attraverso la quale il titolare di un asset immateriale (marchio, brevetto), concede a una terza parte, il licenziatario, il diritto di sfruttarlo in cambio di un corrispettivo economico, la royalty.

Il rapporto di licenza, tuttavia, oltre a rappresentare un valido strumento di diffusione dell’asset immateriale e fonte di guadagno, può originare frodi ed illeciti di varia natura, derivanti da inadempimenti dolosi di clausole contrattuali.

E’ pertanto evidente come le metodologie di fraud auditing abbiano raffinato negli anni gli strumenti volti a tutelare i diritti di licenza attraverso il ricorso a strumenti specifici e moderni.

L’attività “regina” di verifica e controllo in mano al fraud auditor per assicurare ai titolari di marchi e brevetti, che le loro entrate non siano intaccate da comportamenti illeciti, è denominata royalty audit.

Le più sofisticate procedure di royalty auditing derivano dall’esperienza investigativa e mirano sostanzialmente a verificare se il licenziatario ha versato al licenziante l’ammontare di royalty dovuta e adempiuto a tutte le altre obbligazioni di contenuto economico previste dal license agreement.

In buona sostanza la tecnica di contrasto all’illecito in questi casi dovrebbe limitare, o meglio impedire, al licenziatario di sottrarre porzioni di base imponibile sulla quale è calcolata la percentuale di royalty da corrispondere al titolare del marchio.

Molto frequentemente lo strumento licensing è utilizzato per scopi ulteriori rispetto al perseguimento di un interesse esclusivamente finanziario.

Peraltro si sono osservati anche casi nei quali era il licenziatario vittima di una frode ai suoi danni perpetrata dal concedente la licenza.

Per il licenziatario infatti la sottoscrizione di un license agreement è principalmente dettata dall’obiettivo di garantirsi la possibilità di utilizzare una risorsa di natura intellettuale che non è in grado di sviluppare autonomamente, il cui sviluppo comporterebbe costi e tempi di realizzo eccessivi.  Per la sua posizione di dipendenza economica a volte vitale per la sua stessa esistenza, il licenziatario potrebbe essere oggetto di comportamenti predatori e ricattatori messi in atto dal titolare del marchio. 

Banco Ambrosiano: the principal Agreement reached in 1984

by Carlo Calvi

Purpose of this text is to make available the entire set of documents comprising the principal Agreement reached in 1984 for a settlement of Banco Ambrosiano claims. Parties to the Agreement were the International Creditor Banks, the three Liquidations, Banco Ambrosiano SPA (Milan), Banco Ambrosiano Holdings (Luxembourg), Banco Ambrosiano Overseas (Bahamas), the Institute for Religious Works (Vatican) as well as Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano (Milan).

In early 1983 the International Steering Committee of the International Creditor Banks entertained consideration for bringing legal actions against the Institute for Religious Works and Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano. The Creditor Banks held talks based on strong and effective arguments. Joint Co-ordinators were Michael Connolly of the National Westminster Bank and Claude-Eric Paquin of the Midland Bank. Legal advice was provided by Ted Sturmer, senior partner of Wilde Sapte, solicitors for the National Westminster Bank, assisted by Studio Graziadei of Rome. Their counterpart in the negotiations was lawyer Pasquale Chiomenti who operated in ambiguity as to the parties he represented but not on his objectives.

Chiomenti’s stated conditions were the acquisition from the Creditor Banks of their claims on the assets of Banco Ambrosiano Holdings and securing the withdrawal of legal actions against Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano. These pre-conditions would have resulted in the abandonment of assets of the Luxembourg holding by the Creditor Banks to the Italian banks that had joined in the capital of Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano. The International Creditor Banks initiated in March 1983 a legal action against Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano on advice from Studio Graziadei. Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano was identified in the suit as the successor of Banco Ambrosiano SPA. Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano had acquired the Italian loans and deposits of Banco Ambrosiano by decree of the Bank of Italy.

The initiatiative to sue Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano brought immediate results. Pasquale Chiomenti communicated to Ted Sturmer for the first time in the Spring of 1983 that the Vatican was prepared to contribute to the settlement with the Creditor Banks. Chiomenti had the authority to bring the Vatican and Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano into the negotiations but also the Italian Government. The International Creditor Banks had demanded the withdrawal of over $ 200 million of dubious claims by State owned ENI and Banca Nazionale del Lavoro against Banco Ambrosiano Holdings. The Government of Giovanni Spadolini had fallen in 1982, following elections in 1983 a new Government led by Bettino Craxi was in place by the summer of 1983.

The change in Government caused the Vatican, the Italian Government, Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano to accept that the International Creditor Banks should receive compensation for 70% of their claims and that the assets of Banco Ambrosiano Holdings were also to serve the same purpose. The Vatican was pressured by the Italian Government and Banco Ambrosiano SPA Liquidators.

The Vatican was represented in the negotiations by Carlo Cerutti, Adolfo Gatti and Agostino Gambino. British bank Morgan Grenfell was brought in for a monitoring role on behalf of the Vatican and Banco Ambrosiano SPA.

The Craxi Government had resumed talks with the Vatican on the revision of the Concordat between the Italian State and the Holy See, which had been suspended by the Government of his predecessor Giovanni Spadolini. There was a lot more at stake for the Holy See and the Italian Government in the signing of the Concordat and the viability of Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano than a contribution to a settlement with the Creditor Banks.

Bettino Craxi had insisted that the acceptance by the Vatican to make a contribution to the Banco Ambrosiano settlement with the International Creditor Banks be a pre-condition to the signing of the Concordat between Italy and the Holy See. In fact the two events nearly coincided in February 1984. Bettino Craxi had inquired with us through lawyers Giorgio Gregori and Pietro Moscato in the immediacy of my father’s death about the assets of Banco Ambrosiano Holdings.

The International Steering Committee reported to the Creditor Banks on May 4, 1984 it had reached an Agreement for a settlement. The Agreement included the IOR Contribution, Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano Release, Banca del Gottardo Release, and was recommended for acceptance by the Creditor Banks.

Claims by the Creditor Banks were approximately $ 600 million and settlement of $ 406 million represented nearly the 70% they had demanded. Banco Ambrosiano Holdings had entered into an agreement to sell the controlling interest in Banca del Gottardo of Lugano Switzerland, for $144 million.

The Institute for Religious Works disclaimed ownership of the "patronized companies". Proceeds of the realization of assets of these companies were to accrue for the benefit of Banco Ambrosiano Holdings and distribution to the Creditor Banks. Upon payment by the Institute for Religious Works, the Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano Release Agreement became unconditional.

COMMUNIQUÉ WILDE SAPTE (click HERE)

The Agreement was finalized on May 25, 1984 and was subject to approval by the Bank of Italy, the Court of Luxembourg, and the Supreme Court of the Bahamas. Banco Ambrosiano SPA, Banco Ambrosiano Holdings, Banco Ambrosiano Overseas, the Creditor Banks agreed to co-operate in securing the IOR Contribution and in tracing and recovery of assets. They assigned disputed deposits, executed mutual releases and discharged Banca del Gottardo.

The Parties that had negotiated with the Institute for Religious Works decided on the apportionment of its payment. The Creditor Banks were to receive out of the distribution undertaken by Banco Ambrosiano Holdings a total of $ 406 million.

THE PRINCIPAL AGREEMENT WITH SCHEDULES (click HERE)

The Institute for Religious Works committed itself on June 15 1984 to pay $240 million according to a schedule of bank transfers, and waived all claims on Banca del Gottardo of Lugano, Switzerland. They engaged also to deliver the bearer shares of the "patronized companies" they had held in custody at the Vatican to Banco Ambrosiano Holdings. The Parties waived civil claimant joinders in criminal proceedings against the Institute for Religious Works and exempted third party actions.

THE IOR AGREEMENT ENGLISH VERSION (click HERE)

ACCORDO IOR VERSIONE IN ITALIANO CON APPENDICI (cliccare QUI)

Banco Ambrosiano Holdings (Luxembourg) retained the assets of the companies it controlled and the "patronized companies" whose bearer shares it had received from the Institute for Religious Works. Banco Ambrosiano Overseas (Bahamas) was liquidated independently by local officials chosen by a committee of its creditor banks and under the supervision of the Supreme Court of the Bahamas. The IOR Contribution was to be apportioned $ 150 millions to the Creditor Banks, $ 8 millions to Banco Ambrosiano Overseas, $ 40 millions to reserve,the remainder to the Banco Ambrosiano SPA Liquidation. The Creditor Banks were to receive a total of $ 406 Millions from Banco AmbrosianoHoldings from the realization of assets. Banco Ambrosiano Holdings undertook to inform Morgan Grenfell of the realization of assets.

IOR CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENT (click HERE)

The Italian loans and deposits had been secured in the Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano. Pasquale Chiomenti had initially insisted that the assets of Banco Ambrosiano Holdings be acquired by Banco Ambrosiano SPA. The International Creditor Banks had refused. Priority had become the preservation of Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano from claims of the International Creditor Banks. Banco Ambrosiano Holdings, Banco Ambrosiano Overseas, their controlled companies, the Creditor Banks, with the Agreement that follows released Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano from the proceedings they had initiated against it.

THE NUOVO BANCO AMBROSIANO RELEASE AGREEMENT WITH SIGNATURE PAGES (click HERE)

The Parties Banco Ambrosiano Holdings, Banco Ambrosiano Overseas agreed to co-operate in the pursuit of the recovery of funds, free access to books and records, and proportions for sharing the recoveries amongst themselves.

BANCO AMBROSIANO HOLDINGs,BANCO AMBROSIANO OVERSEAS CO-COPERATION AGREEMENT (click HERE)

The Parties apportioned the assets taking account their differing rights and they set out to procure proper releases. A remainder was set aside to be apportioned later. Morgan Grenfell acted as agent for both Banco Ambrosiano SPA and the Institute for Religious Works in verifying distributions. Signing pages for all of the Creditor Banks follow.

MUTUAL RELEASES (click HERE)

SIGNING PAGES (click HERE)

The signature of the May 24 1984 Geneva Agreement had settled debtor creditor relationships among the three main Liquidations. In order to avoid unnecessary and complex litigation among them and ensure an orderly cooperation the Parties reached a further understanding. Focus had turned to tracing assets of those that had been considered as responsible of misappropriations or diversions of funds but were not included in the original accord. These individuals were called the "Tortfeasors". The Geneva Agreement had left the three Liquidations free to pursue them but it had not specified how to avoid conflicts and duplications of competing, overlapping legal actions, and how to share the proceeds.

Particular impetus came from the legal impasse created in Dublin by actions brought by the Banco Ambrosiano Holdings, Banco Ambrosiano SPA Liquidations, for funds controlled by Bruno Tassan Din at the Ansbacher bank. Remaining missing funds amounted to some additional $ 200 million and a criminal bankruptcy trial was being instructed in Milan. The trial in fact did not lead to meaningful recoveries and convictions had limited practical effect since directors did not serve prison terms. Civil settlements that ensued in many jurisdictions around the world did on the contrary achieve substantial results. The three Liquidations established a framework for sharing in these recoveries and in the associated legal costs in specific proportions. This included the succession of Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano as admitted creditor.

Banco Ambrosiano Holdings, Banco Ambrosiano Overseas set out conditions for sharing with Banco Ambrosiano SPA informations that had been obtained under conditions of confidentiality and secrecy imposed by the applicable rules of law, the circulation of information on recoveries due to settlements. Representatives of the Creditor Banks were included in the monitoring of the Agreement.

The satisfaction of 98% of recognized credits was envisaged and in fact both Banco Ambrosiano Holdings and Banco Ambrosiano Overseas achieved near full payout to their respective admitted creditors. This agreement included the list of individual account holders at Banco Ambrosiano Overseas Bahamas. Only Banco Ambrosiano Overseas had few individual account holders. Banco Ambrosiano foreign entities were financed by medium term syndicated bank loans, deposits by Italian State owned ENI and Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, deposits of the Italian banks of the Ambrosiano Group. This last category had been closely monitored by the Bank of Italy and Ministry of Foreign Trade.

It was in fact quite easy to sue the Institute for Religious Works. This was done in the Bahamas by Coopers & Lybrand auditors of Banco Ambrosiano Overseas. In his defence that follows, Archbishop Paul Marcinkus claimed that the letters acknowledging indebtedness he received and returned signed to the auditors from 1977 till 1981 were meaningless and that the auditors should not have relied on them. He admitted meeting auditor Graham Garner at the Vatican. He had however omitted to tell him about the existence of the United Trading Co.

COOPERS & LYBRAND V. ARCHBISHOP PAUL C. MARCINKUS (click HERE)

Banco Ambrosiano Holdings and Banco Ambrosiano SPA Liquidations continued to operate independently till 1996 when under the auspices of Carlo Salvatori of Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano they achieved some level of convergence. The winding down was carried out primarily by Geoffrey Robinson of Deloitte & Touche and Franco Spreafico for BASPA.

Carlo Calvi



[Unfortunately some links don't work. To request the documentation, write to the following email address: info.fraud.auditing@gmail.com]